February,194o

RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Burden of Proof as "Substance" or "Procedure" Under Erie v. Tompkins-Plaintiff brought a bill in equity in
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to remove a
cloud on title to land. Defendants' cross-bill alleged that the deed to plaintiff's predecessors included the strip in controversy through inadvertence
and mistake. Plaintiff alleged that it and its predecessors were purchasers
of recorded legal title for value, without notice of the alleged mistake. The
District Court gave judgment for the defendants. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the ruling was incorrect because under the Texas rule I the
burden of proof is on him who asserts a superior equity as against legal
title. The Circuit Court of Appeals applied what it regarded as the better
rule, placing the burden of proof on the one who alleges purchase in good
faith.2 Held, reversed. The state rule must be followed because the rule
is substantive and not procedural. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 6o Sup.
Ct. 201 (1939).3
By this decision, the Supreme Court has defined one point of the
extremely troublesome line between what is procedure and substance for
application of the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. Certain difficulties
in the way of the decision immediately present themselves. Thus, the holding appears equally applicable to all burden of proof situations, and would
seem to determine with finality that such questions are substantive; yet
no attempt is made to explain the theory under which the Supreme Court
could promulgate Rule 8(c) of the new Federal Rules, 4 whereby the burden of proof in certain enumerated cases is on the defendant in the federal
courts.5 Furthermore, it has been argued that the decision as to whether
i. The Supreme Court cited Teagarden v. Godley Lumber Co., io5 Tex. 616, 154
S. W. 973 (1913) and other Texas decisions. 6o Sup. Ct. at 202.
2. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, ioi F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
This
was on refusal of motion for rehearing; in the prior opinion, ioo F. (2d) 294, the issue
of burden of proof did not arise.
3. The opinion was by Mr. Justice McReynolds.
4. FED. RULEs CIV. PRoC. (1938), Rule 8 (c), following 28 U. S. C. A. § 723c
(Supp. 1938).

5. Actually, Rule 8 (c) sets forth certain matters which must be pleaded as an
affirmative defense. Although it is true that the burden of allegation does not inevitably
determine burden of proof, usually that is the result. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE (1934) 255 et seq.

But the enabling statute under which the rules were

promulgated expressly forbids any change in substantive rights. 48 STAT. 1064, 28
U. S. C. A. § 723b (1934). Furthermore, any attempt by either Congress or the Court
to effect changes in such rights might be unconstitutional. See Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S.64, 77-78; but see concurring opinions by Messrs. Justice Butler (304 U. S.
8o, go) and Justice Reed (304 U. S. go). How, then, can the promulgation of Rule
8 (c) be reconciled with the instant decision? True it is that "substance" may have
different significance for the purposes of construing the enabling act and determining
the conflict of laws rule. Cf. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of
Laws (1933) 42 YALE L. J.333, 337; Sunderland, Characterand Extent of the RuleMlaking Power Granted U. S. Supreme Court (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 404, 405. But
this not a solution of the inconsistency between this decision and the promulgation of
Rule 8 (c), since by the enactment of the rule the Court has impliedly declared that
even for conflict of laws purposes burden of proof is a procedural matter.
In Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. I, 5 (E. D. Ill.
1938) the court construed
Rule 8 (c) as follows: "The Rule has nothing to do with any matter therein [in the
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a given rule is substantive or procedural is in itself substantive and therefore would be referred to the lex loci,' which as it happens is that this is a
procedural matter.7 Then, too, the decision is not in accord with the
majority view, s and the reasons for disregarding that view would seem to
merit some elucidation. Although the Court cited Central Vermont Ry. v.
White 9 as involving an "analogous" situation, neither that nor other previous Supreme Court decisions can be regarded as decisive on the issue."
rule] specifically named, if and when, by applicable substantive law, it shall constitute
part of the substance of plaintiff's case which must be alleged and proved by him." See
also Holtzoff, Twelve Months under the New Rules (1940) 26 A. B. A. J.45, 46. Any
other result would render it void. This interpretation, of course, would solve the difficulty, but only by construing away the rule entirely; it means that the rule requires
allegation of such defenses by the defendant only where the state rule so stipulates, and
consequently the rule might just as well never have been adopted. This construction
does not accord with the express words of the rule, which was in all probability intended as a codification of the former federal rule. I MOORE AND FRIEDMAN, MOORF'S
FEDERAL PRAcrIcE (1938) 571. Of course, to avoid the difficulty here discussed the
authors of this treatise had to conclude that the matter was a procedural one. On the
same conclusion see the assumption made in language by Circuit Judge Clark in Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Clum, io6 F. (2d) 592, 595 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
No other relevant construction of Rule 8 (c)has been discovered. In Schopp v.
Muller Dairies, 25 F. Supp. 5o (E. D. N. Y. 1938), 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 344 (1939),
the court reached the same result as in the Humphrey case, but did not mention Rule
8 (c). It simply stated the old federal rule that the burden of proof of contributory
negligence was on the defendant, then said that under the Erie case "This rule must
now be changed" to conform to the state rule. It is interesting to note that both of
these cases ultimately reached the same result as the Supreme Court does here.
6. (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 344, 346.
7. Jones v. Louisiana Western Ry., 243 S. W. 976 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922). The
case concerned an action for wrongful death, the operative facts occurring in Louisiana;
although it does not expressly appear that the holding as to burden of proof was necessary to the decision, it would seem unlikely that the court would frame the opinion as
it did (see 243 S.W. at 979) unless a different result would have been produced.
The problem, of cburse, is solved by the application of the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1934) § 7, which provides that where there is a difference in the conflict of
laws rules of the forum and the foreign state, the rule of the forum is applied, and
further (§ 584), that whether a given matter is substance or procedure is determined
by the court at the forum. Thus, in the instant case, the federal rule (now) is that
burden of proof is a substantive matter; therefore under the Erie rule, the Texas law
should be adhered to. This view has not gone uncriticized. See, for example, McClintock, DistinguishingSubstance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1930) 78 U. OF
PA. L. Rx-v. 933, 937 et seq.
While the Restatement seems an easy solution of the difficulty, still some express
reference to the question in the instant case would have been helpful. Was the Supreme
Court consciously adopting the position taken by the Restatement, or was it, like so
many other courts, ignoring the problem entirely? In any case, if this matter is now
regarded as decided by necessary implication, this part of the Restatement must be
engrafted upon the Erie doctrine.
8. RESTATEMENT, § 595, Comment a; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938)
§ 81 ; Notes (1932) 78 A. L. R. 883, (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472, 1478.
9. 238 U. S.507, 512 (1915).
io.In the White case, the question arose as to which law should determine the
issue of the burden of proof of contributory negligence, in an action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. The Court held that Congress, in passing the Act, intended

to incorporate the federal rule as to burden of proof, which was "'part of the very sub-

stance'" of plaintiff's case. (Instant case at 203, quoting from the White case.)
That the White case did not set the matter at rest is shown in Leach, State Law
of Evidence in the Federal Courts (930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 554, 571 et seq., and by
such decisions as Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American Co., 189 U. S. 221 (1903).
Compare the interpretation by Professor Leach of the opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes,
in Leach & Co. v. Peirson, 275 U. S. 120 (1927) (43 HARV. L. REV. at 576), with that
by Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New FederalRules (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
622, 630. See also Leach, supra at 571, 572 for discussion of the inter-circuit conflict
on this issue.
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But, notwithstanding the apparent impossibility of unravelling some, at
least, of these difficulties, the result may well justify the cutting of the
Gordian knot. While burden of proof has generally been regarded as procedural, a few dissents have been voiced, pointing to certain substantive
aspects involved,"' since "often the location of the burden . . . is really
decisive . . ."12 And while the term is ambiguous,"3 it would seem the
more desirable view to include as substance, for this purpose, any rule which,
when operating on a given set of facts relevant on the merits, would determine the result.14 It must also be noted that the instant decision does seem
to fit into the more desirable trend in the field of conflict of laws.' 5 Moreover, if the above view as the nature of burden of proof is accepted, it also
seems in accord with the principal basis for Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, which
was to foreclose the situation whereby a party could materially affect the
Of course, before the New Rules, whether the federal courts in following state laws
of evidence felt impelled to do so by the Conformity Act, requiring procedural conformity to state rules (7 STAT. 196 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A. §724 (I928)), or by the
Rules of Decision Act (I STAT. 92 (789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1928)) was imma-

terial. But solution of the present problem would be materially affected by the answer
to that question; however, no such answer is forthcoming. 3 MOORE: AND FRIEDMAN,
op. cit.
supra note 5, at 3058. It may safely be stated, therefore, that previous decisions
of the Supreme Court do not furnish such unequivocal authority as would of itself
justify disregarding the majority view.
On the other hand, the instant result was foreshadowed by the reasoning of Mr.
Justice Black, dissenting, in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U. S.161, 175 (1938),
and by the comment on that case in (1938) 5 U. OF CH. L. RrV. 685, 688.
ii. Cook, supra note 5, at 346.
12. Ibid. Professor Cook here is referring to burden of proof of contributory negligence; he seems to give credence to a possible distinction between the nature of burden
of proof in these and other cases.
At first glance, the possibility appears that this decision can be explained as applicable only to cases involving trial of title to land. That this is unlikely, however, would
follow from the fact that the Court cited the White case, which involved burden of
proof of contributory negligence; furthermore the reasoning seems equally applicable to
other situations as well.
13. The difficulties involved in its definition are pointed out in THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 354 et seq. Certainly the term is frequently
used to convey "The peculiar duty of him who has the risk of any given proposition
-who will lose the case if he does not make this proposition out, when all has
been said and done". Ibid. (Italics supplied.)
14. Where this is most likely to occur, of course, is in those cases where no evidence is available, or in any other instance where the evidence on both sides is approximately equal in weight. On the other hand, if the facts which will be shown to the
jury clearly point to a conclusion, burden of proof will have no effect on the outcome.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in the instant case, stated that "There is no question
as to the rights of a bona fide purchaser, or as to whether the facts established make
complainant out such, but only a question of how and by whom the facts shall be shown
to the court". IOI F. (2d) at 316. If this be true, then little basis would appear for
the answer of the Supreme Court that the burden of proof, in this case, "relates to a
substantial right upon which the holder of recorded legal title may confidently rely". 6o
Sup. Ct. at 203. Of course, in absence of the record, no appraisal on this point can be
made. But the case is an excellent illustration of the difficulty of drawing the distinction between the two types of burden of proof cases for the purpose of applying a different conflict of laws rule; and since in some cases at least the substantial outcome is
affected, these cases should carry the entire burden of proof category into the "substance" class-particularly in view of the argument outlined in note 15 infra.
15. I. e., the trend to classify as many subjects as possible so as to require conformity with the law of the state where the operative facts occurred. As phrased by
the Restatement, the only limitation on "all-inclusive reference to the foreign law" concerns those phases which "make administration of the foreign law by the local tribunal
impracticable, inconvenient, or violative of local policy". (Introductory Note, Chapter
As Professor Cook has pointed out, ". . . today it is generally no more difficult
12.)
to know the foreign law as to burden of proof" than as to "'substantive'" law. Cook,
loc. cit. supra 'note iI.
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result of his case 16 by bringing suit in, or removing to, the federal courts.' 7
Finally, in its broader aspects, to the extent that the result further narrows
the sphere for independent federal decisions on non-federal issues, the holding would seem to conform to the enlightened and modern attitude of
judicial self-limitation adopted by the Court in recent years.',
Federal Jurisdiction-Federal Court Venue in Suits Against Foreign Corporations Within a State Permitting Such Corporations to Do

Business Upon Appointment of Agent to Accept Service-Claiming
diversity of citizenship to invoke federal jurisdiction, plaintiff, a citizen of
New Jersey sued defendant in a federal court within New York. Defendant was incorporated in Delaware and authorized to do business in New
York, having appointed an agent to receive service in compliance with New
York's statute.' Defendant moved to dismiss complaint for a federal statute allows suit only in the district in which the plaintiff or the defendant is
a resident. 2 Held, (three justices dissenting) motion dismissed, appointment of the agent was consent by the corporation to suit in federal courts
within the commonwealth, waiving the venue requirement. Neirbo Co. v.

Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 7 U. S. L.

WEEK

579 (U. S. 1939).

From 1887 until this decision due to conflicting views of lower federal
courts,3 it was doubtful whether a foreign corporation by appointing an
agent to accept service under a state statute, 4 although subject to state court
16. This does not include such effect because of local prejudice, which of course is
specific grounds for removal and was one of the main purposes of the creation of a
national judiciary.
17. See, in addition to the Erie case (304 U. S. 64), the dissenting opinions by Mr.
Justice Holmes in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 370 (igio), and in Black
& White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532 (1928), as well as
the commentators cited in Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472, n. 14. This, of course, is
the same argument referred to in note 15 supra, applied to the federal-state problem.
I. This attitude may be said to date back several decades for its beginnings to
such decisions as those of Mr. Chief Justice White in the early cases where the Court
was called upon to pass upon and construe the powers of modern administrative bodies
(see, for example, (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. ioIo, loir n. 5) and manifesting itself,
very recently, in the enlarged discretion conceded to Congress in the exercise of the
commerce and taxing powers, decisions interpreting the National Labor Relations Act,
etc.-a trend profoundly influenced by, if not deriving its total inspiration from, the
views of Mr. Justice Holmes.
I. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW (Cum. Supp. 1939) c. 28, §210 (1).
2. 24 STAT. 552 (887), amended 25 STAT. 433 (I888), constituted § 51 (a) of the
JUDICIAL CODE, 36 STAT. 1101 (191), 28 U. S. C. A. § i12 (1927).

"No civil suit shall

be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit
shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant."
3. The dissenting opinion has support in the lower court decision of the instant case,
1o3 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, i939) ; Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower, 46 F. (2d) 678
(D. Md. 1931) ; Hamilton Watch Co. v. George W. Borg Co., 27 F. Supp. 215 (N. D.
Ill. 1939). The majority view has precedent in Patten v. Dodge Mfg. Corp., 23 F. (2d)
852 (D. Ind. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 6o F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932) ; Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., ioo F. (2d) 770 (C. C. A. ioth,
1938), (I939) 7 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1034 (discussing other grounds for decision),
aff'd, 7 U. S. L. WEEK 6 44 (U. S. 1939) (on the authority of the instant case).
4. The right of a foreign corporation to transact business within the boundaries of
a state depends entirely upon the state's permission. See Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 507 (1926); Washington e.r rel. Bond and Goodwin and
Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 36I, 364 (I933). Conditions imposed by the
states must be in accordance with the constitution and laws of the United States.
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, IS How. 404 (U. S. 1855). See 4 THoMrPSOx, COrORA-
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jurisdiction,5 was also subject to the jurisdiction of federal courts within
that state. Under the statute of 1875, allowing suit in a district of which
the defendant "is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found" 6, Ex Parte
Schollenberger 7 held that a foreign corporation in this situation consented
"to be found". Consequently there was conformance with venue requirement and jurisdiction by the federal court.8 The divergence of opinion
arose only after this statute was amended in 1887 by deleting the "found"
clause.9 The instant decision holds that the Schollenberger case was based
on consent to be sued, not on consent "to be found", 0 and consent waived
the venue requirement," which is only a defendant's privilege not a restriction on jurisdiction. 12 This consent extends to "all" the courts having jurisdiction over the subject matter "within" the commonwealth.' 8
The
TIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 67IO; Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 321.

The requirement that an agent be appointed within

the state is reasonable. See St. Clair v. Cox, io6 U. S. 350, 356 (1882). But to forbid resort to the federal courts is unreasonable. See Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 879, 881-882.
5. See St Clair v. Cox, io6 U. S. 350, 355 (1882) ; Commercial Mutual Accident

Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 253 (199o). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934)
§ 91; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Jones, 1933)
§ 8641; GOoDRIc H, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 73; Rothschild, Jurisdiction of
Foreign Corporationsin Personam (i93o) 17 VA. L. REV. 129.
The development and criticism of the theories permitting a foreign corporation to
be sued is interesting. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet 519, 588 (U. S. 1839). See
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1927) 184; MooEn FEDERAL
PRACTICE (1938) § 487; Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and. Individuals
Who Carry on Business Within the Territory (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 676; Fead,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 Mica. L. REV. 633; Stimson, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (2933) 18 ST. Louis L. REV. 195.
6. JUDICIARY ACT of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § I, 18 STAT. 470 (1875) : "And no civil

suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original
process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in
which he shall be found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceeding."
7. 96 U. S. 369 (2877).
8. See HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CoNxsTiTUTIONAL LAW (1918) 84-89.
9. See note 2 supra.
'O. Two decisions allowing federal court jurisdiction because of "consent" formed
the basis of the Schollenberger decision: Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404
(U. S. 1855) ; Railroad Company v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65 (U. S. 287o). The instant
interpretation had been made in Consolidated Store-Service Co. v. Lamson Consolidated
Store-Service Co., 41 Fed. 833 (C. C. D. Mass. i8go) ; Haight & Freese Co. v. Weiss,
156 Fed. 328 (C. C. A. Ist, 1907).

See Note (1935)

35 CoL. L. REV. 591, 592 n. 13.

ii. That neither the plaintiff nor the defendant reside in the district in which the
suit is brought does not prevent the operation of the waiver. Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129 (1894). See 4 THoMPsON, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 3016.
12. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369 (1887) ; Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,
260 U. S. 653 (1923), overruling,Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449 (i9o6), and qualifying the dictum in In re Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 500-501; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U. S. 177 (1929). Thus Justice Nelson's opinions in Day
v. Newark India Rubber Mfg. Co., I Blatch. 628 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i85o) and Pomeroy v. New York, N. H. R. R., 4 Blatch. 120 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1857) have been definitely overruled. See DOBI. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
(1928) § 116; EDMUNDS, FE. RULES Civ. PRoc. (1938) 295.

AND

PROCEDURE

13. Instant case at 580; see Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining
239, 255 (I9o5).
Other courts reach the same result but find conformity with, rather than waiver of,
the venue requirement, saying that a corporation located in another state by appointing
an agent becomes an inhabitant of this state for service under the Act of 1887. United
States v. Southern Pacific R. R., 49 Fed. 297 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1892) ; Gilbert et al. v.
New Zealand Ins. Co., 49 Fed. 884 (C. C. D. Ore. 1892) ; Shainwald v. Davids, 69 Fed.
704 (N. D. Cal. i895). Contra: Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444 (892) ;
Co., 196 U. S.
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dissent refuses to extend consent beyond the state courts for compliance
with a state statute does not show such consent, 14 and a state statute cannot
confer jurisdiction on a federal court.15 However, since the objective of
the state statute is to relieve citizens of unnecessary travel and expense, the
interpretation permitting free selection of the most desirable court within
the commonwealth seems reasonable.16 Certainly the defendant is not
being substantively injured by suit in a federal rather than a state court,
and, since the defendant has consented to a suit under the same process,
the situs of suit is not being arbitrarily fixed by the plaintiff. In addition,
this view merely gives plaintiff an equal opportunity to choose jurisdiction,'17 for defendant, being sued in the state courts, could remove to a federal court.' 8 Furthermore, the elimination of the "found" clause was not
to relieve federal court congestion by removal of this type of suit,' 9 but
rather to prevent service upon a mere sojourner. 20 Therefore, since lack of
venue is only a dilatory plea and can be waived in many ways, 21 it is difficult to find any basis other than a strict interpretation of the venue statute
to justify the minority opinion.
Federal Jurisdiction-Privilege of a Federal Court to Disregard a
Lower State Court's Treatment of a State Statute-The beneficiary of
a savings account transferred in trust for her claimed the account upon the
death of the trustee. A statute ' of New Jersey, the place of the trust, provided that "Whenever any deposit shall be made . . . by any person in
trust for another . . . the same or any part thereof . . . shall [in the event
accord, Campbell v. Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry., 5o Fed. 241 (C. C. D. Minn. 1892).

See

Note (933) II TEx. L. REV. 359, 366.
14. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444 (1892) ; see Southern Pacific Co.
v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 208 (1892) ; In re Keasbey and Mattison Co., i6o U. S. 221
(1895) (citing the Shaw and Denton cases). The Shaw case is distinguishable for

there is no mention of an agent being appointed under a state statute, and the Denton
case is only a dictum. Yet these two cases furnish the "entire precedent" upon which
a host of lower federal court opinions are based. McLean v. Mississippi, 96 F. (2d)
741 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; Kerfoot v. United Drug Co., 38 F. (2d) 671 (D.Del. 193o) ;
Toulmin v. James Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 512 (W. D. N. Y. 1939); cf. Heinie Chimney
Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 12 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926). For other cases see
note 3 supra under "dissenting opinion".
15. Hagstoz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 179 Fed. 569 (C. C. E. D. Pa. igio).
16. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S.369 (877) ; see Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 253 (I9o9).
17. In Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270 U. S.363, 366
(1926), plaintiff claimed that since defendant could secure removal in these cases and
since removal could only be granted in causes of action over which the federal court
had orginal jurisdiction, that therefore federal courts had original jurisdiction in this
situation, despite the venue statute. The argument was rejected by the court.
18. Railroad Company v. Koontz, 104 U. S.5 (1881) ; General Investment Co. v.
Lake Shore and M. S. Ry., 260 U. S. 261 (1922).
19. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927)
136-145. But cf. Toulmin v. James Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 512, 514 (W. D. N. Y. 1939).

2o. Riddle v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 39 Fed.

1889).

290, 291

(C. C. W. D. Pa.

21. Venue may be waived by a plea to the merits [Detroit Trust Co. v. Pontiac
Savings Bank, 196 Fed. 29 (i912), aff'd, 237 U. S.186 (r915)]; by a general appearance [Mankin v. Bartley, 266 Fed. 466 (C. C. A. 4th, I92O), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 631
(192o) ] ; by agreement [Platt v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co., 103 Fed. 705 (C. C. D.
Mass. 19oo)] ; by a failure to raise the issue properly. See Dobie, Vente in Civil Cases
in the United States District Court (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 129, 131.
For a discussion of the early functions of jurors which gave rise to venue requirements, see Scor, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW (1922) 18-23.

i. N. J.Laws 1932, c. 40 and 41.
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of the death of the trustee] be paid to the person in trust for whom the
said deposit was made. .

.

."

Two decisions

2

of the Court of Chancery

of New Jersey had held that the statute did not change the preexisting law
rejecting tentative trusts. On appeal from the decision of the Federal District Court of New Jersey denying the beneficiary's claim it was held (one
judge dissenting) that the beneficiary's claim should be allowed since the
statute validates tentative trusts in New Jersey. The Court of Chancery
decisions need not be followed because not rendered by a court whose decisions construing a state statute are binding on the Federal Courts.3 Field v.
Fidelity Union Trust Co., No. 7055, Oct. Term, C. C. A. 3 d, December
20, 1939.

From the outset, Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 requiring
Federal Courts to apply the state law in diversity of citizenship cases had
been held to include as such law the construction placed upon state statutes
by state courts. 4 An early pronouncement of the Supreme Court indicated
that, since only the highest state court could settle the state law, only the
construction of that court need be followed, and that, absent such construction, the federal court could exercise its independent judgment in determining the meaning of a statute.5 Perhaps as a result of the recognition
of the difficulties felt to be caused by the failure of the federal courts to
adhere to state decisions, the Supreme Court in Erie R. R. v. Hilt 1 receded
2. Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Company, ii N. J. Eq. 408, 182 At. 912 (1936)
and Travers v. Reid, i1 N. J. Eq. 416, 182 AtI. 9o8 (1936).
3. The New Jersey Court of Chancery is a court of original jurisdiction. From it,
however, there is but one appeal, to the Court of Errors and Appeals. All decrees and
writs of the Court issue through the Chancellor who is also a member of the Court of
Errors and Appeals. The jurisdiction of the Chancery Court is state wide.
4. In Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters I, 18 (U. S. 1842) state decisions construing statutes were excepted from the doctrine there established of independent federal court decisions on matters of "general" common law. But compare Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595,
598 (U. S. 1855). In later years, of course, this rule was removed definitely from the
realm of speculation. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896) ;
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165 (1923) ; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S. 234 (1923) ;

Steinbach v. Metzger, 63 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933). And compare Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, i Wall. 175 (U. S. 1864) with Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.
S. 238 (1928). In Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 58 (933)
it was said that even a
considered dictum of the highest state court construing a statute is binding.
5. Beals v. Hale, 4 How. 37 (384o). To the same effect is Anglo-American Land
Co. v. Lombard, 132 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o4) cert. denied, 196 U. S. 638 (3904).
For a clear exposition of the rule see Continental Sureties Co. v. Interborough R. T.
Co., 165 Fed. 945 (C. C. N. Y. 19o8). See also Montgomery v. McDermott, 3o3 Fed.
8oi (C. C. A. 2d, igoo).
Lower federal court decisions upholding the principle are: Freund v. Yeagerman,
27 Fed. 248 (C. C. Mo. 1886); Federal Lead Co. v. Swyers, 161 Fed. 687 (C. C. A.
8th, 39o8) ; United States Telephone Co. v. Central Union Telephone Co., 2o2 Fed. 66
(C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 Fed. 599 (C. C. A.
8th, 1913).

Contrary to this principle and standing alone at its time is In re Gilligan, 152 Fed.
6o5 (C. C. A. 7th, 19o6) where the federal court felt bound by a construction of an
Indiana statute by the Appellate Court of that state. In reaching its conclusion the
court referred to the fact that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court of Indiana was
final except where transferred to the state Supreme Court or ordered there on certiorari, and said that "The most that could be said would be that the Appellate Court,
seeking to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court, had probably inisinterpreted them
-an assumption that would not relieve . . . the United States District Court . . .
from the duty of following the decision.
6. 247 U. S. 97 (i938). See also Erie R. R. v. Duplak, 286 U. S. 44o (3932). But
compare Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U. S. 27 (935).
In Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3oo U. S. 5 (1937) the Supreme Court considered binding
on it a decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois involving the construction of a trust
deed. While the majority opinion in the instant case refers to this decision as being an
application of the doctrine res adjudicata,at least one other writer saw in it a tendency
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from its position to the extent of reversing a lower federal court which had
failed to follow the construction placed upon a New Jersey statute by the
Supreme Court of that state, an intermediate appellate court. This decision
and similar ones by lower federal courts, if they eliminated conflicting interpretations of statutes by federal and some state courts, raised the new
problem of what state courts were entitled to be followed in their interpretations of statutes. Thus certain intermediate appellate courts were accorded
the distinction of being followed, 7 others not," and the decision of at least
one trial court was held not to merit binding authority in the federal
courts.9 It was and is a matter of doubt whether the decision in the Hilt
case was that the federal court had violated the Judiciary Act by not applying the state law as determined by the New Jersey court or simply
erred, as a matter of comity, in not giving a particular state court the
weight its decision deserved.' 0 If the latter be the true meaning of the
Hilt decision, and there are words in the opinion to justify the conclusion
that it is," then the decision of a court not the highest still does not determine the state law and may, on occasion, be disregarded without the violation of the principle of comity. On this interpretation of the Hilt case,
and on this reasoning following from it, the instant decision can be justified
legally, for the Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the Court of Chancery
decisions were clearly erroneous in their failure to apply the New Jersey
statute.72 If the Hilt decision meant that the New Jersey Supreme Court's
construction determined the law of the state, which must be followed by
the federal courts, the instant decision is on less firm ground, since the
distinctions to be drawn between the Supreme Court and the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey on the basis of their relative importance in the
state court system are hardly real. 3 Thus if the decisions of one are deterto regard a clear decision by an intermediate state court as controlling. I MooRE AND
FmMMAN, Mooan's FEDEAi. PRAcricn (1938) 97.
7. Murray v. Payne, 273 Fed. 82o (C. C. A. 3d, 1921) (Supreme Court of New
Jersey); Berlet v. Lehigh Valley Silk Mills, 287 Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923) (Superior Court of Pennsylvania) ; North Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 13 F. (2d) 585
(C. C. A. 3d, 1926) (Supreme Court of New Jersey) ; Masino v. West Jersey & S. S.R. R. Co., 41 F. (2d) 645 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) (Supreme Court of New Jersey); Ex
parte Zwillman, 48 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 3d, i931) (Supreme Court of New Jersey);
Taplinger v. Northwestern National Bank, ioi F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) (Superior Court of Pennsylvania).
8. Irving National Bank v. Law, 9 F. (2d) 536 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (N. Y. App.
Div.); In re Gary, 281 Fed. 218 (S. D. Tex. 1922) (Tex. Court of Civil Appeals).
9. In re F. & D. Co., 256 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) (Special Term of the Supreme Court of New York).
io. The majority and dissenting justices in the instant case differed on this point.
And compare the opinion in Taplinger v. Northwestern National Bank, ioi F. (2d)
274 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) with that of Berlet v. Lehigh Valley Silk Mills, 287 Fed. 769

(C. C. A. 3d,

1923).

ii. Mr. Justice Holmes writing for the Court in the Hilt case concluded his opinion: "In view of the importance of that tribunal [the Supreme Court] in New Jersey,
although not the highest Court in the State, we see no reason why it should not be followed by the Courts of the United States, even if we thought its decision more doubtful
than we do." Erie R. R. v. Hilt, 247 U. S. 97, ioo (1918). This might mean that were
the Supreme Court's opinion very doubtful it need not be followed.
12. See Stimson, Swift v. Tysonz--Wltat Remains? (1938) 24 CORN. L. Q. 54, 71,
saying that even where there is a decision of the highest state court it should not be
fpllowed if the Federal Court believes it will be overruled.
13. As pointed out by the minority in the instant case there is but one appeal from
both the Supreme and Chancery courts, i. e., to the Court of Errors and Appeals. Further the two courts have coextensive territorial jurisdiction; and the fact that the
Supreme Court Judges help make up the Court of Errors and Appeals is met by the
supervision of the Chancery Courts by the Chancellor, also a member of the Court of
Errors and Appeals. The two tribunals are considered equally important in New Jersey. Ramsey v. Hutchinson, II7 N. J. L. 222, 187 AtI. 65o (1936).
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minative of the state law, so ought also to be the decisions of the other.
On policy grounds, the instant decision is to be deplored, for all of the evils
of independent federal court decision on matters of state law pointed out in
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 14 can exist as well where a lower as where the
highest state court is not followed. The violence of the Supreme Court's
attack on the principle of independent federal decision on matters of "general" common law leads toward the belief that eventually the federal
courts will no longer be free to ignore the decisions of lower state courts
in the matter of statutory construction. It would seem that the real problem for the future will be the determination of how deep into the state court
system the federal judiciary's search for a binding construction of a state
statute must go.

Municipal Corporations-Delegation by a Municipality to a Private Corporation of the Right to Perform a Municipal Duty-Taxpayers sued to enjoin the proposed construction of a sewage system to be
paid for in part from the proceeds of township "non-debt revenue sewer
bonds" to be issued pursuant to the Act of 1937,1 and secured solely by a
pledge of the charges for the use of the sewage system. Pledge was to be
made effective by a trust, with the trustee (a private corporation) assuming
active duties during the construction of the sewer, and in specified contingencies, taking actual possession of, and running the system.2 Held
(one justice dissenting), insofar as the Act of 1937 authorizes a municipality to delegate to a private corporation powers of management of and interference with a municipal improvement, it violates the Pennsylvania Constitution 3 and is void. Lighton v. Abington Township, 9 A. (2d) 6o9
(Pa. 1939).
The attitude of the Pennsylvania court is not in accord with the
modem trend to delegate to municipal corporations, authorized to con14. 3o4

U. S. 64 (1938), 86 U.

OF

PA. L. REv. 896.

I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 53, § 19092-2445: "For the purpose
of financing the cost or expense, of constructing or acquiring a sewer, sewer system or
sewage treatment works, either singly or jointly with other municipalities or townships, or both, any township may issue non-debt revenue bonds secured solely by a
pledge, in whole or in part, of the annual rentals or charges for the use of such sewer,
sewer system or sewage treatment works. Said bonds shall not pledge the credit, nor
create any debt, nor be a charge against the general revenues, nor be a lien against any
property of the township, but shall be a lien upon and payable solely from the annual
rentals or charges for the use of said sewer, sewer system or sewage treatment works."
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 53, § I992-2446: "Any township may
enter into any deeds of trust, indentures or other agreements with any bank or trust
company or other person or persons in the United States having power to enter into
the same, including any Federal agency, as security for such bonds, and may assign and
pledge all or any of the revenues or receipts of the sewer system or sewage treatment
works thereunder. Such provisions as may be customary in such instruments or as
the township may authorize, including (but without limitation) provisions as to--(i)
the construction, improvement, operation, maintenance and repair of any sewer system
or sewage treatment works and the duties of the township with reference thereto; (2)
the application of funds and the safeguarding of funds on hand or on deposit; (3) the
rights and remedies of said trustee and the holders of the bonds (which may include
restrictions upon the individual right of action of such bondholders) ; and (4) the terms
and provisions of the bonds or the resolutions authorizing the issuance of the same."
3. PA. CONST. art. III, § 20: "The General Assembly shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise
or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held
in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever."
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struct and finance a revenue-producing business, the same broad and elastic
powers which any private corporation engaged in a similar activity would
have by virtue of its charter.4 In general, the purpose of the creation of
revenue bond statutes has been to eliminate the necessity for the creation
of public corporations known as "Authorities". 5 These statutes usually
delegate to an existing municipal corporation broad powers similar to
those powers which would be delegated to an "Authority" if one were
created for the purpose.6 However, since the Pennsylvania state legislature
is constitutionally prohibited from giving a private corporation the right to
perform a municipal duty, 7 the court concluded that the legislature might
not authorize a municipality to do what it itself could not do, and hence
such a delegation by a municipality is likewise prohibited., This conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow. 9 As stated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the objects of this section are to prevent the separation of
power to incur debts from the duty of providing for their payment by taxation,10 and to protect against the exercise of the taxing power by officials
not subject to the control of the people.'" Clearly, the Act of 1937 violates
neither objective.12 Under the bonds in question, which provide that the
Township can only be compelled to pay "out of annual rentals or charges",
the liability of the Township or the taxpayer can in no way be increased
above the present liability. 3 In case of default, the title to the sewage
system would remain in the Township, and the operation of the system and
the collection of rents would be the only thing taken over by the trustee.14
If the Township created an "Authority" for the purpose of carrying out
the present project, similar action by the "Authority" would be legal;'"
but if the "Township" undertakes to carry this out itself, and it does not
increase the indebtedness any more than if an "Authority" were used, it is
illegal.' 6 This seems to be as impractical a distinction as the one attempted
4. The older revenue bond laws, enacted before 1935, are characterized by the detail
with which the legislature prescribed the manner in which the newly conferred powers
might be exercised, e. g., 2 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 9977; MIcH. PUB. AcTs
1933, No. 94, p. 117. Compare with these, N. C. LAws 1935, c. 473. Section 3 of this
Act reads: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of this State that any municipality
acquiring, purchasing, constructing, reconstructing, improving, bettering or extending
an undertaking pursuant to this act shall manage such undertaldng in the most efficient
manner consistent with sound economy and public advantage to the end that the services
of the undertaking shall be furnished to consumers at the lowest possible cost. No
municipality shall operate such undertaking primarily for profit but shall operate such
undertaking for the use and benefit of the consumers served by such undertaking and
for the promotion of the welfare and for the improvement of the health and safety of
the inhabitants of the municipality."

5.See Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enterprises (1936) 35 MicH. L. REv.

1, 30.

6. See note 5 supra.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. Instant case at p. 612.
9.Such a conclusion does not follow from the wording of article III, section
see note 3 supra. WHrrITE,

2o;

COMMXENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA

(19o7) 270: "This section needs no explanation further than to say that it was enacted

for the purpose of limiting the interference by the Legislature with local matters which
ought normally to be managed by local authorities." (Italics added.) See notes io, ii

infra.
io. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 AtI. 289 (1934).
ii. Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Pa. 225, 195 Atl. 9o (1937).
12. See note i supra.
13. Ibid.
613.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.
Samuel, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A. (2d) 834 (1938).
16. Instant case at p. 61o.
14. Instant case at pp. 61,

1939)

tit. 53, § 2900 et seq.; Williams v.
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17
Howby the dissent between proprietary and governmental functions.
ever, the explanation of the decision would seem to be that the Pennsylvania court is apt to take a more rigid attitude in construing broad grants
of power to a municipal corporation than in construing similar grants to an
"Authority" created as an agent of the state.

Suretyship-Married Woman's Liability on Mortgage Bond in

Pennsylvania-Husband and wife owned property as tenants by the
entireties. Husband's application for a loan in his own name, secured by
a mortgage on the property, was approved; but upon plaintiff's learning of
wife's interest, the bond and mortgage were required to be executed by
husband and wife jointly. They were joint payees of plaintiff's check for the
loan and both endorsed it. Wife's uncontroverted testimony was to the
effect that she had nothing to do with the loan application, did not know

what she was signing and received none of the proceeds.

On appeal from

a judgment for wife in a suit on the bond, held (three justices dissenting),
that the wife is a joint maker of the bond and is not released as a surety.

Peoples-PittsburghTrust Co. v. McCaffrey, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec.
I8, 1939, P. I, col. 5 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1939).
This decision is rather startling since the facts strongly indicate that
the wife was a surety and, under the Act of 1893,1 married women cannot
be surety for another in Pennsylvania. Careful distinction must be main-2
tained between their unlimited right to pledge or mortgage their property
and their disability of giving a note as surety secured by such property.'
In determining whether a woman is surety or primary obligor on a bond,
of
the court has consistently pierced the form and examined the substance
4
the obligation, even though she may apparently be the sole obligor. Thus
negotiates the
the status of suretyship is found where the other borrower
6
loan 5 and the woman receives no benefit therefrom, regardless of any
appearance of joint obligation. Conversely, where her interest in the mort17. Instant case at p. 614. See Seasongood, Municipal Corporation: Objections to
the Governmental or ProprietaryTest (1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 91o, 938.

1. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, § 32. For general discussion, see
O'Brien, The Growth in Pennsylvania of the Property Rights of Married Women
49 Ami. L. REG. 524; Reader, Married Women's Contracts of Suretyship (1934)
(9o)
38 DIcK. L. RE;v. 230; Note (1939) 6 U. OF PITTSBURGH L. REV. 29.
2. Kuhn, Trustee v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 303, 35 Atl. 957 (1896) ; Righter v. Livingston, 214 Pa. 28, 63 Atl. 195 (igo6) ; Hastings Bank of Hastings v. Covitch, 324 Pa.
171, 188 Atl. 129 (1936).
3. Commercial Acceptance Corp. v. Ruppel, 295 Pa. 88, 146 Atl. 98 (1929). "The
reason for distinguishing this right to pledge or mortgage her property from the right
to act as a surety, guarantor or endorser for the payment of a husband's obligations is
obvious. If the wife has the power to sell or mortgage her property and apply the
money to the satisfaction of his debts, there is no reason why she may not subject it to
a mere contingent liability for the same purpose. The liability following suretyship,
guaranty or endorsement, however, is general and personal, and is not limited to specific property." Hastings Bank of Hastings v. Covitch, 324 Pa. 171, 172, 188 Atl. 129
(1936).
4- R. Patrick & Co. v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526, 3o Ati. io44 (895) ; Pine Brook Bank
v. Kearney, 303 Pa. 223, 154 Atl. 365 (1931) ; Munn, Trustee v. Lorch, 305 Pa. 55, 156
Atl. 97 (1930 ; Sears v. Birbeck, 321 Pa. 375, 184 Atl. 6 (1936) ; Western Nat. Bk. of
York v. Levin, 331 Pa. 113, 2oo Atl. 71 (938).
5. Oswald v. Jones, 254 Pa. 32, 98 Atl. 784 (1916) ; McKean v. Enburg, 325 Pa.
456, 188 Atl. 835 (937) ; see Scott v. Bedell, 269 Pa. 167, i69, 112 Atl. 43, 44 (1920);
York Trust Co. v. Vandersloot, 334 Pa. 591, 592, 6 A. (2d) 498, 499 (1939).
6. Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59, 56 Atl. 323 (1903) ; Manor Nat. Bk. v. Lowery,
242 Pa. 559, 89 Atl. 678 (914) ; McKean v. Enburg, 325 Pa. 456, i88 Atl. 835 (1937);
Western Nat. Bk. of York v. Levin, 331 Pa. 113, :2oo At. 71 (1938).
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gaged property is enhanced,7 or she receives proceeds from the loan," she
is liable as co-obligor on the bond. Upon this latter authority, the majority
of the instant court reasoned that since the wife endorsed the check representing the loan in the capacity of joint payee, she was a co-recipient of the
money and it liable as co-maker of the bond, it being immaterial what she
does with the proceeds when once acquired. 9 Heretofore, however, the
court has held this to be insufficient where the woman does not have full
control and dominion over the money so as to be able to dispose of it as
she wishes. 10 Manifestly, as the strong dissent points out, the question of
surety or co-maker is a factual one for the jury whose answer should be
conclusive,"- the burden of proof being upon the immunity-seeking
woman. 12 That the wife was a surety would seem to be established by the
jury's verdict in her favor, affirming her testimony that she actually received
nothing from the loan and played no part in securing it. Certainly then,
the instant opinion goes further than any of record in reversing the jury's
finding and disregarding any element of suretyship. Whether or not it
represents the proscription of married women's sole remaining contractual
disability remains to be seen from future judicial interpretation.

Trade Regulation-Exemption of Co-operative Agricultural
Associations From the Operation of the Sherman Act-Defendants 1
were indicted under the Sherman Act 2 for engaging in a combination and
conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce in fluid milk among the several
states by fixing and maintaining prices to be paid to producers and to be
charged by distributors to consumers; and by controlling the supply of milk
moving in interstate commerce. On appeal from a ruling quashing the
indictment,' it was held, that the combination charged in the indictment
was not removed from the operation of the anti-trust laws under the exemp7. Olney Bank & Trust Co. v. Gettlin, 318 Pa. 76, 177 At. 794 (1935) ; Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Koller, 319 Pa. 249, 178 Atl. 814 (1935) ; Hanover Trust Co. v.
Keagy, 335 Pa. 356, 6 A. (2d) 786 (939).
8. Newton Title & Trust Co. v. Underwood, 317 Pa. 212, 177 Atl. 27 (0935);
Frankford Trust Co. v. Wszolek, 320 Pa. 437, 183 Atl. 52 (2936) ; York Trust Co. v.
Vandersloot, 334 Pa. 591, 6 A. (2d) 498 (939).
9. The Class & Nachod Brewing Co. v. Rago, 240 Pa. 470 (1913) ; Newton Title
& Trust Co. v. Underwood, 317 Pa. 222, 177 Atl. 27 (1935); Western Nat. Bk. of
York v. Levin, 331 Pa. 113, 2oo Atl. 71 (1938).
io. R. Patrick & Co. v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526, 3o AtI. io44 (1895) ; Sears v. Birbeck,
321 Pa. 375, 184 At!. 6 (1936) ; Western Nat. Bk. of York v. Levin, 332 Pa. 223, 20o
At!. 71 (1938).
ii. The Class & Nachod Brewing Co. v. Rago, 240 Pa. 470 (1913); Manor Nat.
Bk. v. Lowery, 24 Pa. 559, 89 AtI. 678 (2914); Frankford Trust Co. v. Wszolek,
320 Pa. 437, 183 Atl. 52 (1936) ; Sears v. Birbeck, 321 Pa. 375, 184 Atl. 6 (x936).
12. Frankford Trust Co. v. Wszolek, 320 Pa. 437, 283 Atl. 52 (2936) ; Sears v.
Birbeck, 321 Pa. 375, 284 Atl. 6 (2936) ; McKean v. Enburg, 325 Pa. 456, 188 At. 835

(1937).
i. The defendants were comprised of five different groups: (i) distributors, (2) a
co-operative association of milk producers, (3) a milk wagon drivers' union, (4) municipal officers, (5) two arbitrators of a dispute between the producers and distributors.
The opinion of the court was, as is the comment here, chiefly concerned with the
federal exemptions of agricultural associations from the anti-trust laws.
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1927).
3. United States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp. 177 (N. D. Ill. 1939). The exceptional right of appeal of the Government in this case, was provided for in the Criminal
Appeals act, 34 STAT. 1246 (2907), 18 U. S. C. A. § 682 (1927).
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tions provided for agricultural associations in the Clayton,4 CapperVolstead, and Agricultural Marketing Act." United States v. Borden Co.,
7 U. S. L. WEEK 665 (U. S. 1939).
Agricultural producers' co-operatives and marketing associations have
shared the unsettled fate of labor unions under anti-trust laws. 7

Agree-

ments and contracts among the members which in effect restrain trade are

necessary for success in organizing and operating these farmers' associations," but they were originally held unlawful under the broad terms of the
Sherman Act.9 The increase in number and economic importance of such
associations,' 0 however, has influenced a reversal of judicial and legislative2
attitude." Statutory exemptions of these groups from the anti-trust laws,'
4. Specifically § 6, which reads: ". . . Nothing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." 38 STAT. 731 (914),
I5 U. S. C. A. § 17 (1927).
5. 42 STAT. 388 (1922) 7 U. S. C. A. 291, 292 (1939).
6. 50 STAT. 248 (I937), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 671-4 (1939).
7. See Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: 1 (1939) 39 CoL. L. Rzv.
1283, for the most recent review of the varying decisions under the anti-trust laws involving labor unions.
The question as to whether the Sherman Act applied to the labor union involved
in the case at hand, see note I supra, was not presented to the court in this appeal. Instant case at 669.
8. See Goldberg, Co-operativeMarketing and Restraint of Trade (1928) 12 MAR.
L. REv. 270, 277; Marx, New Interpretations of the Anti-Trust Law as Applied to
Business, Trade, Farm and Labor Associations (1928) 2 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 211, 220;
Torbiner, Cooperative Marketing and the Restraint of Trade (1927) 27 COL. L. REV.
827, 830; Note (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 87, 89.
9. Under state re-enactments of the Sherman Act they were held invalid in Ford
v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Assoc., 155 Ill. I66, 39 N. E. 651 (895); Reeves v. Decorah
Farmers Cooperative Society, i6o Iowa 194, 14o N. W. 844 (1913). See Note (1924)
38 HxAv. L. REv. 87, 89.
2o. Cadwallader, Government and Its Relationship to Price Standards in the Milk
Industry (1938) 22 MINN. L. REv. 789, 821; Marx, New Intcrpretatios of the AntiTrust Law as Applied to Business, Trade, Farm and Labor Associations (1928) 2 U. OF
CIN. L. REV. 211, 220. See CURTIS, TRUSTS AND ECONOMIC CONTROL (1931)

441-447

ii. No better example can be found than the instant court. In the leading case of
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (igoi), the instant court held a statute exempting farmers' co-operatives from the anti-trust laws was unconstitutional as
a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The distinctions drawn and obiter dicta in
National Union Fire Insur. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71 (1922); International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199 (1924) and Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assoc., 276 U. S. 71 (1928) are generally considered as having in effect overruled the Connolly case. EULER, MANUAL OF MONOPOLIES AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1929)

§ 270.

Compare also the annotation (1922)

ii A. L. R. 1185 with (1923)

25 A. L. R.

1193.

12. Despite the Supreme Court ruling in the Connolly case, note ii supra, the following statutory exemptions from the anti-trust laws were enacted for agricultural cooperatives and are still in force. ALA. CODE ANN. (1928) § 7152; ARIZ. REV. CODE
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 574; CAL. AGRIC. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 1218; 3 FLA.
Comp. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1928) §§ 6489-65o9; GA. CODE (933) § 65-220; 2 IDAIro
CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 22, § 2020; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill & Moore, 1933) c.32,
§ 455 (22) ; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 3644; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) c. I7, § 1619; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll's Baldwin, 1936) § 883-28; i LA.
GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) § 239; ME. REv. STAT, (1930) C. 59, § 28; Mn. ANN.
CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 445; 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 157, § 16; MICH.
ComP. LAWS (Mason's Supp., 1933) § 17115-558; 1 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§§6Og9, 61o6; 2 Miss. CODE (1930) §4124; 1 MO. STAT. ANN. (1932) 519; 2 N. H.
PUBLIc LAWS (1926) c. 224, § 46; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, Supp. 1938)
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once held unconstitutional as a denial of the equal protection and due
process clauses,' 3 are now generally sustained as reasonable classifications.'"
The language of the instant court declaring the provisions of the federal
acts pleaded by the defendants may be valid defenses to anti-trust prosecution' is an illustration of present judicial policy. More valuable is the
demarcation of lawful co-operative activity in the opinion. Ruling that the
statutes pleaded merely enable the formation of co-operatives as per se
lawful organizations, not in restraint of trade, and do not protect them from
prosecution for monopolistic practices in the conduct of their business,
seems a reasonable limitation.16 Because of the public benefit derived from
the existence of co-operative agricultural associations, their establishment
should hardly be declared an evil which the anti-trust laws were designed
to prevent. But the legislative exemptions enacted to facilitate the production and marketing of food should not blind the courts from the realization that these combinations may conspire with other co-operatives, middlemen, distributors or unions, to control production and maintain false price
levels,' 7 evils which led to the passage of the Sherman Act. While the
distinction made by the court does not at once settle all the monopoly problems involving these groups,' it does provide a practical rule of reason, 9
which, in the absence of revision of the anti-trust laws, should serve as a
sound interpretation of the exemptory provisions in the Clayton, CapperVolstead and Agricultural Marketing Acts.
§ 31-218; N. Y. Co-op. CoRP. LAW (Supp. 1939) § 128; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935)
§ 5259 (m); N. D. CoMP. LAws (Supp. 1925) § 46o9b26; Okla. Sess. Laws 1937, c.

38, art. 9, §21; 2 ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) tit. 25, § 822 (Cf. the effect of the Milk
Control Board Act, 5 ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) tit. 4, § 2o6) ; TENN. CODE (1932)
§ 3826; TEx. STAT. (1928) art. 5762; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (I933) tit. 2, § I7; VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 4722 (12) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 1955;
Wis. STAT. (1931) § 133.04; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) art. 28, §§ 723-724.
Several states have separate laws as regards milk co-operatives since the recent
statutes establishing milk control boards; for example, see Oregon statute cited supra.
See Cadwallader, Goveriment and Its Relationship to Price Standardsi- -theMilk Industry (938) 22 MINN. L. REv. 789, 8og. To bring such exemptions into the federal
laws, Congress enacted the statutes cited by the defendants. Id. at 822.
13. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (igoi); Beatrice Creamery
Co. v. Cline, 9 F. (2d) 176 (D. Colo. 1925), (1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 378. Cf. United
States v. King, 25o Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916).
14. The statutory exemptions of the state laws, note 12 supra, have been upheld in
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assoc., 276 U. S. 71
(z928); Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assoc., 2O Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33
(1923) ; Castorland Milk & Cheese Co. v. Shantz, 179 N. Y. Supp. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ;
Northern Wisconsin Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936
(IT94), and in the majority of those states having these exemptions. See notes (1932)
77A. . R. 405, (1935) 98 A. L. R. 1407.
15. Instant case at 667.
16. Cf. United States v. King, 229 Fed. 275 (D. Mass. i915). See Note (3932) 41
YALE L. J. 888n; THORNTON, CoMBINATIoNs IN REsTRAINT OF TRADE (3928) § 566.

Cadwallader, Government and Its Relation to Price Standards in the Milk Industry
(1938) 22 MINN. L. RV. 789, 827.
137. For a discussion of the events leading up to the present prosecution, see Milk
in Chicago, FORTUNE, Nov. 1939, p. 8o; and of the evils of the present milk monopolies,
Let 'Em Drink Grade A, id. at 83, reprinted in READER's DiGEST, Jan. 194o, p. 78.
x8. The opinion does not treat of the questions as to what acts on the part of the
various agencies in milk marketing are unreasonable restraints of trade, or what effect
the new milk control statutes have on anti-trust laws.
ig. The question seems ultimately to be one of the reasonableness of the restraint
of trade. Thus, by the statutory exemptions, Congress has declared that the mere
formation of the co-operative is not an unreasonable restraint. See THORNTON, op.
cit. supra note 16 at § 566. However, the court well implies that this does not mean
that they are not able to restrain trade once formed. Marx, New Interpretationsof the
Anti-Trust Law as Applied to Business, Trade, Farm and Labor Associations (1928)
2 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 211, 221.
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Workman's Compensation-Right of Subrogation Denied Employer-Employee's original injury was aggravated by a physician's
malpractice. The employee was awarded compensation for the total injury
and later made a settlement with the physician for the malpractice injuries.
Held, that the employer is not entitled thereby to have the compensation
award reduced to cover the original injury only. McGough v. McCarthy
Improvement Co., 287 N. W. 857 (Minn. i939).
By the rules of causation,' an employee whose original injury is aggravated by the malpractice of an attending physician is entitled to compensation for the whole of the injury suffered. 2 In these situations, it does not
matter whether the physician be selected by the employer s or the
employee. 4 Although the compensation statutes 5 give a new right of action
to the employee as against the employer which is based on their relationship," the employee's common law right of action against the third party
tort-feasor, based on negligence, is not abrogated.7 The overwhelming
i. For a general treatment of the rules of causation see HARPER, ToRTs (1933)
(,934) §§430-453. HARPER at section iio has a definition of proximate cause that is helpful, and the RESTATExENT at section 457 discusses
rules of causation applicable to the instant case.
§§

107-129; RESTATEmENT, TORTS

z Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F. (2d) 434 (C.C. A. 9th, 1928), cert. denied,
277 U. S. 577 (1928) ; Roman v. Smith, 42 F. (2d) 931 (D. Idaho 393o) ; Parchefsky
v. Kroll Bros., Inc., 267 N. Y. 410, 196 N. E. 3o8 (935), rev'g, 242 App. Div. 346,
275 N. Y. Supp. 322 (3d Dep't 1934), (1935) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. 140; Rigney v. Snellenburg & Co., go Pa. Super. 237 (1926). Contra: Ruth v. Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98
Kan. 179, 157 Pac. 403 (1916) (adopted the English rule that improper medical treatment is an intervening independent act) ; cf. Ellamar Mining Co. of Alaska v. Possus,
247 Fed. 42o (C. C. A. 9th, 1918); Mossop v. Mossop, 1o8 Conn. 148, i2 At. 739
(1928).

Pertinent to the point in question is the opinion of the court in Parchefsky v. Kroll
Bros., Inc., 267 N. Y. 410, 412, 196 N. E. 308, 310 (935), rev'g, 242 App. Div. 346,
275 N. Y. Supp. 322 (3d Dep't 1934) : "'The rule is now well established that a wrongdoer is liable for the ultimate result, though the mistake or even negligence of the
physician who treated the injury may have increased the damage which would otherwise have followed from the original wrong.' . . . We have consistently applied the
same rule to awards of compensation."
3. See cases cited note 2 supra.
4. This is, of course, subject to the qualification that the employee must use due
care in selecting his physician in order not to violate tort law. "There are numerous
authorities which hold that under compensation acts when the primary injury suffered
by the workman is thereafter aggravated or increased by the negligence, mistake or
lack of skill of a physician or surgeon, if reasonable care has been exercised by the injured party in selecting his services, the combined injury is compensable. . . ." McDonough v. National Hospital Ass'n, 134 Ore. 451, 461, 294 Pac. 351, 354 (1930).
Supporting this rule are: O'Quinn v. Alston, 213 Ala. 346, 304 So. 653 (1925) ; Powell
v. Spencer Bros., 6 La. App. 669 (1927) ; Polucha v. Landes, 6o N. D. 159, 233 N. W.
264 (1930) ; Yarrough v. Hines, 112 Wash. 310, 192 Pac. 886 (392o); cf. Oniji v. Studebaker Corp., 196 Mich. 397, 163 N. W. 23 (97).
5.These are completely listed in HILL & WILKIN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
STATUTE LAW (1923).

6. Instant case at 86o; New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
"It would seem to require no argument that the Workmen's Compensation Acts were
designed to create new rights and new obligations as between employers and their employees. It was felt that the hazards of industry-those of a purely accidental nature
and those produced by actual negligence-were such as might best be met by a system
which is, in effect, 'industrial insurance'. Liability was to be predicated not on fault,
but on mere relationship." Leidy, Malpractice Actions and Compensation Acts (1931)
29 Micr. L. REv. 568.
7. Smith v. Golden State Hospital, iii Cal. App. 667, 296 Pac. 127 (3931) ; Froid
v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 36 P. (2d) I56 (934) ; Overbeek v. Nex, 261 Mich. 156, 246
N. W. i96 (933) ; Leidy, loc. cit. supra note 6; ef. Paine v. Wyatt, 217 Iowa 1147,
251 N. W. 78 (933). Contra: Alexander v. Von Wedel, 169 Okla. 341, 37 P. (2d) 252
(1934) ; Hinkelman v. Wheeling Steel Corp., I14 W. Va. 269, 171 S.E. 538 (1933)
Hunt v. Bank Line, 33 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929), (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 933.

RECENT CASES

majority of courts, in dealing with this situation, have allowed recovery for
the aggravation from either party; 8 but where the employee sues both parties, the courts will apply some equitable principle as the doctrine of subrogation, 9 or impress a trust' 0 for the benefit of the employer. Nevertheless,
a double recovery has been allowed for the same injury,"- the rationale of
the court being that the compensation award is set arbitrarily with the
wage-scale as a basis and does not take into account the damage suffered."2
That theory would be supportable were the recovery from the third party
limited to pain and anguish, and excluded compensation for the added wage
loss occasioned by the aggravation." Conversely, if the employer pays
compensation for the full wage loss, he should be ultimately entitled only
to the amount of compensation payments caused by the aggravation.' 4
"The purpose and effect of the Workmen's Compensation Acts is to control and
regulate relations between an employer and his employees . . . The law does not
attempt in any way to abridge the remedies which an employee of one person may have
at law against a third person for a tort which such third person commits against
him. . . ." Smale v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., i6o Wis. 331, 334, 151 N. W. 8o3,

804 (1915).

& "The statute gives to an injured employee a right of election whether to take
compensation under the statute or to pursue his common-law remedy against a third
party whose negligence has caused the injury." Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., Inc., 267
N. Y. 410, 415, 196 N. E. 308, 311 (1935), reig, 242 App. Div. 346, 275 N. Y. Supp.

3:2 (3d Dep't 1934). In general see cases cited supra notes 4 and 6. Contra:
Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) (under the California statute), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 577 (1928) ; Roman v. Smith, 42 F. (2d) 93' (D.
Idaho, 193o) ; Ross v. Erickson, 89 Wash. 634, 155 Pac. 153 (1916). For a vehement
attack on the reasoning used and the results reached in these cases see Leidy, supra
note 6, at 577-583.
9.Uva v. Alonzy, 116 Conn. 91, 163 Atl. 612 (1933) (employer reimbursed);
Bronder v. Otis Elevator Co., 121 Neb. 581, 237 N. W. 671 (1931); Scheno Trucking Co. v. Bickford, 115 N. J. Eq. 380, 17o AtL 881 (934), (1935) 4 MERCER BEAsi.

L. REV. 98; Globe Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Lighterage Corp., 244 App. Div. 97, 278 N. Y.

Supp. 212 (ist Dep't 1935), aff'd, 271 N. Y. 234, 2 N. E. (2d) 640 (1936); Mayhugh v. Somerset Telephone Co., 265 Pa. 496, iog Atl. 213 (192o) ; VAXCE, INSURANCE
(2d ed. 1930) 68o-i; Hardman, The Common Law Right of Subrogation Under Workmen's Compensation Acts (1920) 26 W. VA. L. 0. 183; (1938) I6 T-x. L. REv. 437.
io. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Chartrand, 239 N. Y. 36, 145 N. E. 274
(924) (employer gets a lien), revg, 209 App. Div. 352, 204 N. Y. Supp. 791 (1st
Dep't 1924) ; McKenzie v. Missouri Stables, Inc., 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S. W. (2d) 136
(1930), (i93) x6 ST. Louis L. REV.337; Reynolds v. Grain Belt Mills Co., 2= Mo.
App.
380, 78 5. W. (2d) x24 (i934) ; (1928) 28 Coi L. Ray. 390.
1u.County of San Bernardino v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 70 Cal. App.
376, 13 P. *(2d) 829 (1932) (settlement with T held invalid); Atlantic Ice & Coal
Corp. v. Wishard, 30 Ga. App. 730, 19 5. E. 49 (1923) (in accord with instant case) ;
Chisholm v. vocational School for Girls, 103 Mont. 503, 64 P. (2d) 838 (1936), (1937)
1o ROCxZ MT. L. Rmv. 6o (prior recovery from T considered a gift); Chickasha Motor Co. v. State Industrial Comm., 174 Okla. 304, 50 P. (2d) 308 (1935) (settlement
with T held invalid) ; Te
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, 3o0 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ.
App.), writ of error refused, 117 Tex. 173, 3o0 5. W. 672 (I927), (I928) 6 TEx. L.
REV. 404 (employee allowed to recover compensation in two states). See also Note
(1933) i3Oma. L. REv. 72, in which the implication is made that a double recovery is
permissible.
12. Although the courts often seem to base their ultimate holding on other grounds
-see cases cited supra note 11-this factor seems to be fundamentally the most persuasive. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, 3oo S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App.), writ
of error refused, 117 Tex. 173, 300 S.W. 672 (1927).
13. Leidy, supra note 6, at 573-574; Hardman, supra note 9,at 186-187; (1933) r>
So. CALi L. REV. 258.
14. Cf. Leidy, supra note 6, at 584:

".

•

.

if the employee has been awarded com-

pensation for the entire period of disability . . . there would seem to be no real reason why he should not pursue his common law action just the same, being sure, of
course, that either the doctor or the employer shall have a remedy over for any surplus
which may come to the employee by virtue of an apparent double payment." The footnote to this sentence states the following: "It would seem that the employer should be.
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Although it may be difficult to apportion the wage loss, the problem is
15

merely one of fact to be governed by a finding based on the evidence.
Possibly, the employee's settlement with the physician did not include
compensation for the wage loss suffered in the instant case and this may
have been persuasive in inducing the court's decision. 16 But the court
made no attempt to limit its holding to such a situation 1 7 and is to be
criticized for avoiding the logical result ' 8 and following the view at one
time held by the New Jersey courts 19 -- that this situation is curable only by
legislative amendment. 20 Especially is21this true in view of the fact that
Minnesota precedent is to the contrary.
preferred. After all, under the Acts, he is paying compensation in many cases in which
at common law there would be no liability whatever. The physician, on the other hand,
is only being forced to pay in accordance with his common law liability."
i5. This was done with great exactness by the compensation board in County of
San Bernardino v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 70 Cal. App. 376, 13 P. (2d)
829 (932).

i6. The instant case at 859 discloses the fact that the employee settled with the
physician for a total of $125o net whereas compensation payments had already far exceeded that total.
17. Instant case at 862.
18. "(The injury) Being so considered within the statute for purposes of compensation, how can it be put outside for purpose of subrogation?" Stone, J., dissenting
in the instant case at 866.
ig. For an excellent discussion of the development of law in New Jersey on this
point see (1935) 4 MEacER BEAsLav L. Rlv. 98.
2o. Instant case at 862.
21. Thornton Bros. Co. v. Northern States Power Co., I51 Minn. 435, i86 N. W.
863, 187 N. W. 6zo (Ig2), where not only was the employer subrogated into the employee's rights as against the third party tort-feasor, but was allowed attorney's fees
as well.

